This paper determines whether adopting the basket-peg rather than the ‡oating regime is optimal for emerging countries. Under the basket-peg regime, there is a trade-o¤ between practical usefulness and welfare losses associated with the movements of capital across countries. We use a small open-economy model with micro foundations to provide a simple basket weight rule. Although this is sub-optimal, we show it is practical and easy to implement. After calibration using Singaporean and Thai data for the period 1997Q3-2006Q2 and comparison among the cumulative losses associated with the policy instrument rules, we show that a commitment to the basket weight rule is superior to other instrument rules under the ‡oating regime for small open emerging countries like Singapore and Thailand.
losses using the actual shock data for the period from 1997Q3 to 2006Q2 under the …ve instrument rules, and discuss the superiority of basket weight rule relative to interest rate rule, money supply rule, or trade weight rule in terms of welfare losses which the monetary authority attempts targets to minimize. Furthermore, we also contrast the cumulative loss under the basket weight rule with those under other four policy instrument rules, computed for the long span (60 quarters) using the random shocks drawn from the distributions of the shocks for post-Asian Currency Crisis period and consider the optimal instrument rule for the span.
There are three major implications in this paper. The …rst is that we obtain a simple basket weight rule, which is sub-optimal in aspect of deviation from the optimal weight derived in Yoshino, Kaji, and Asonuma (2004, 2009 ), but is easy to practically implement as the monetary authority needs to calculate only two key variables such as in ‡ation and the output gap similar to the Taylor rule in Taylor (1993) .
The second implication is that we can show that the relative superiority of basket weight rule when compared to the interest rate rule, money supply rule, or trade weight rule in a small-open economy like Singapore and Thailand where the exchange rate variances are moderate (around 5%) by comparing the welfare losses associated with policy instruments. There are two reasons for relative superiority of the basket weight rule: one is that the monetary authority can focus only on e¤ects of the yen exchange rate, since the dollar rate is endogenous, but determined solely by the yen exchange rate as long as it maintains the weighted averages of exchange rates at the constant value by foreign market interventions. The other is that by committing to the basket weight rule, the monetary authority is able to stabilize the impacts on the output gap and in ‡ation rate through exchange rate channels which are missing under the interest rate rule or money supply rule.
Lastly, in the long span which the variances of the exchange rates are really low, the interest rate rule could also be one of the options for the monetary authority as shown in the simulation case of Singapore.
Needless to say, our analysis can be applied to any small open country deliberating upon the optimal choice between adopting the basket-peg or ‡oating regimes.
The paper is organized as follows; Section 2 overviews the previous literature. We provide a smallopen economy model in the Section 3. We de…ne and derive the equilibrium depending on exchange rate regimes in Section 4. Later in Section 5, we specify the optimal instrument rules. Numerical analysis using Singaporean and Thai data on the basis of theoretical study, are presented in Section 6. Lastly, a brief conclusion summarizes the discussion.
Literature Review
The paper is related to several studies that have concentrated on the basket-peg regime in East Asia.
Ito, Ogawa and Sasaki (1998) and Ogawa and Ito (2002) analyze the optimal basket-peg regime under a partial equilibrium model, which does not involve capital movements. Yoshino, Kaji, and Suzuki Shioji (2006a Shioji ( , 2006b ) discusses the basket-peg regime under two di¤erent invoicing schemes, producer currency pricing (PCP) and vehicle currency pricing (VCP). Our paper di¤ers from these papers in that our concern focuses on the optimality between adopting the ‡oating and the basket-peg regimes 56 .
Furthermore, there is one stream of the literature discussing interactions of monetary policy and exchange rates under a small open-economy with micro foundations as Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) , or Gali and Monacelli (2005) . For example, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) show that to the extent there is perfect exchange rate pass through, they …nd that the central bank should target domestic in ‡ation and allow the exchange rate to ‡oat, despite the impact of the resulting exchange rate variability on the consumer price index. On the other hand, Gali and Monacelli (2005) analyze the relative superiority of three policy regimes in terms of their implied volatility for nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade. This paper improves upon in this aspect by including in the basket weight as the instrument policy for the monetary authority under the basket-peg regime. 5 Rajan and Siregar (2002) consider and contrast the experiences of Hong Kong and Singapore to discuss whether the small and open economies in Asia should commit to rule out exchange rate adjustments or to precede domestic policy objectives such as output and employment growth. 6 Devereux (2003) also explores the role of the exchange rate regime in small economies with particular interest on the di¤ering cases of Hong Kong and Singapore.
In this section, we explain the model. Our model is a small-open economy model, which the rest of the world is comprised of two big countries. It is an extended version of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) .
There are four modi…cations with respect to their model. Firstly there are two foreign countries which are relatively large compared with home country in our model, while Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) assume one foreign country. The second modi…cation is that our focus is not only on the ‡oating regime and the …xed regime as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) , but also on the basketpeg regime. Thirdly, unlike perfect capital mobility in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002), we assume imperfect capital mobility across home and foreign countries. Lastly, in contrast to assumption that symmetric …rms which use only labor inputs, serve both domestic and foreign markets in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) , we consider asymmetric …rms serving domestic and foreign markets with di¤erent input shares of labor and imported intermediate goods (such as oil).
We assume that there are three countries as shown in Figure 1 ; Thailand (Home), Japan (Foreign A) and the US (Foreign B). In our home country, there are three sectors; households, …rms, and the central bank. We denote home country with the superscript h , Japan with the superscript J , and the US with superscript U S . These countries share the same preferences and technologies. These countries produce traded goods, which are imperfect substitutable in utility. While capital is mobile between two foreign countries, it is imperfectly mobile between home and foreign countries.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Consumption goods, price index, and demands
The consumption basket of household in the home country, is de…ned as follows.
where i ; i = H; J; U S expresses the preference on goods produced in i 7 . C i t ; i = H; J; U S is the demand of the home household for goods produced in country i, and is the elasticity of substitution among goods produced in three countries. 7 We assume H + J + U S = 1
By cost minimization of the home representative household, we obtain the following demand conditions;
where P C t is the consumer price index (CPI) de…ned as follows and P i t and the price index of goods produced in country i denominated in Home currency respectively.
We assume that the law of one price holds for goods produced in foreign countries. It implies that
where P J t and P U S t are the foreign currency price of foreign-produced goods respectively and S
B=Y t
and S
B=$ t
are the nominal baht-yen and baht-dollar exchange rates. For simplicity, we assume that all Japanese goods are sold for price P J t and all US goods are sold for price P U S t in home country.
These speci…cations imply that exchange rate pass through is complete.
As was the case of New Keynesian model, we concentrate on the percentage deviations around the steady state 8 . Letting lower letters denote percentage deviations around the steady state of the corresponding upper letters.
Equation (4) and (5) can be written as
Equation (1), (2) , (3) can be expressed as
(1') 8 See for example Gertler (2001, 2002) 
In this expression, CPI in ‡ation depends on both PPI (producer price index) in ‡ation rate H t , and changes of real exchange rates.
Households and asset market
The utility function of a representative household in Home country at time t is de…ned as:
Inside the bracket, the …rst term captures the instantaneous utility from consumption and the second term expresses the instantaneous utility from money holdings, where M t denotes a representative household's money holdings. The last term de…nes the disutility from labor e¤ort, where L t is the labor supply by a representative household. Discount rate is denoted by .
A representative household consumes, holds nominal domestic money M t and a nominal bond denominated in the Home currency, B t , and a nominal bond denominated in the US dollar, B U S t .
Only Home residents are assumed to hold the money in the domestic economy. The household budget constraint in real term is therefore:
where i t and i U S t are the nominal yields on the bonds in terms of the Home currency and in terms of the US dollar; t is the dividends from …rms.
A representative household maximizes (7) subject to (8) . Euler, money demand equation, and labor-leisure optimality equations are derived from …rst-order condition respect to domestic bonds holding, money holdings and labor.
With …rst order condition of US bonds holding and (9), we ful…ll the uncovered interest parity condition between domestic and US bonds incorporating the risk premium t+1 , shown as
Log-linearized version of equation (9)- (12) are shown as
Firms
There are two types of …rms in home country: …rms serving domestic market and …rms exporting to foreign markets.
Firms serving domestic market
There is a continuum of …rms selling products in the domestic market indexed [0; n H ]. Producer price index (PPI) is composite of prices set by individual …rms de…ned as follows: 9 .
Firms maximize the expected pro…ts subject to three constraints. The …rst one is a production function summarizing available technology. The technology for a monopolistically competitive …rm z in country i is:
where Y H t (z) is the output of the …rm z in period t and F t is a country speci…c productivity shifter.
and H H t (z) express labor employed and imported raw materials used by …rm z respectively.
The second constraint on the …rm is the demand curve each …rm faces. This is given by
The third constraint is that each period some …rms are not able to adjust their prices. The speci…c model of price stickiness we will use is based on Calvo (1983) . Each period, the …rms that adjust their prices are randomly selected, and a fraction 1 ! of all …rms adjusts, while the remaining ! fraction does not adjust. The parameter ! is a measure of the degree of nominal rigidity; a larger ! implies that fewer …rms adjust each period and the expected time interval between price changes is longer. Those …rms that adjust their prices at time t do so to maximize the expected discounted value of current and future pro…ts. Pro…ts at some future date t + s are a¤ected by the choice of price at time t only if the …rm has not received another opportunity to update its price between t and t + s. The probability of this is ! s .
Before analyzing the …rm's pricing decision, we consider its cost minimization problem which involves minimizing cost of labor and imported raw materials subject to (14) . This problem can be 9 Similarly, the goods produced in Home can be de…ned as follows;
, where is the degree of substitutability among the goods produced in Home.
So that demand for good z can be expressed as C
written, in real terms (divided by producer price index), as
where H t denotes the real marginal cost of …rms serving domestic market. The …rst order condition
The log-linearized version can be expressed as
The …rm's pricing decision problem then involves picking p H t (z) to maximize
where discount factor d s;t+s is given by
We assume p H t be the optimal price chosen by all …rms adjusting at time t 10 . The …rst order condition for the optimal price of p H t is
Consider a case in which all …rms are able to adjust their price every period (! = 0). When
When prices are ‡exible, all …rms charge the same price. In this case, p H t = P H t and t = 1 M .
1 0 Though individual …rms produce di¤erenciated products, they all have the same production function technology and face a demand function with constant and identical demand elasticities. In other words, they are essencially identical, except that they may have set their current prices at di¤erent dates in the past. However, all …rms adjusting in period t face the same problem, so all adjusting …rms will set the same price.
Using the expression for real marginal cost, this implies
When prices are sticky (! > 0), output can di¤er from the ‡exible-price equilibrium level. Because the …rms will not adjust their prices every period, they must take into account expected future marginal cost as well as current marginal cost whenever they have an opportunity to adjust their prices. The aggregate price index is an average of the prices charged by the fraction 1 ! of …rms setting their prices in period t and the average price of remaining fraction ! of …rms setting their prices in earlier periods. However, because the adjusting …rms were selected randomly among all …rms, the average price of non-adjusters is the average of prices of …rms that prevailed in period t 1.
Thus, from de…nition of PPI, the average price in period t satis…es,
Equation (16) and (17) can be approximated around a zero-average in ‡ation, steady-state equilibrium to obtain an expression for aggregate in ‡ation of the economy;
where, =
andmc t is the real marginal cost de…ned with the producer price index, expressed by a percentage deviation around its steady-state value.
Using equation (6),
e B=$ t (18')
Current CPI in ‡ation rate depends on both expected in ‡ation rate and real marginal cost, which are the same factors appear in the in ‡ation adjustment equation mentioned in Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (2002) ) will lead to increase current in ‡ation.
Exporting …rms
Similarly, there is a continuum of exporting …rms index [0; n EX ]. Export price P EX t is composite of prices set by individual …rms de…ned as follows;
Each exporting …rm maximizes the expected pro…ts subject to two constraints. The …rst one is a production function summarizing available technology shown as
The other constraint on the …rm is the demand curve each …rm faces. This is given by C
Contrary to …rms serving domestic markets, these exporting …rms can adjust their price every period.
We consider the …rms' cost minimization problem which involves minimizing the cost of labor and imported raw materials subject to (14'), which is quite similar to …rms serving only the domestic market. The …rst order condition of this problem implies
where EX t is equal to the exporting …rm's real marginal cost.
We assume that the exporting …rms serves with local currency pricing (LCP) 11 1 1 We assume that foreign countries are large relative to home country, thus their CPI in ‡ation is not a¤ected by home exporting …rms' pricing behavior. Moreover, the foreign markets are more competitive relative to domestic …rms, the exporting …rms adjust the prices more frequently than one serving domestic …rms.
We obtain a similar equation as in Section 3. 
Foreign countries
In order to have the analysis simple, we assume that foreign countries are large relative to our home country. It follows that it is now unnecessary to distinguish between CPI in ‡ation and PPI in ‡ation in the foreign countries. Moreover, it also implies that foreign output level is the same with their consumption level.
Goods produced in Home are sold to both domestic residents and foreign residents. Home exporting …rms serve foreign markets with local currency pricing (LCP). Let C J;H t and C U S;H t be foreign consumption of home produced good. Assuming that foreign households have the same preferences as those of the home residents (so the demand elasticity is the same), we have
where
Log-linearized version of equations (20) are
Euler equations for foreign households respectively imply, on the assets and holds money supply on the liability.
Interest rate rule
We start by assuming that the home central bank adopts the ‡oating regime and implements the interest rate rule. 
Basket-peg regime
Case (3) and (4) are analyzed under the basket-peg regime 13 . The basket is a weighted average of the real baht-yen rate and real baht-dollar rate. The home central bank intervenes into foreign exchange market to maintain the basket equation expressed in log-linearized form given as 14
Equation (23) shows that the baht-dollar rate has a one-to-one relationship with the baht-yen rate.
It indicates that the baht-dollar and baht-yen rates always change in opposite directions if equation (23) is maintained. The baht-dollar rate is endogenous, but determined solely by what happened to the baht-yen rate. As the Home central bank must intervene in the foreign exchange market to move the baht-yen and baht-dollar rates in just such a way that equation (23) We consider two rules under the basket-peg regime: one is that the home central bank commits to the basket weight rule where the weight depends on in ‡ation and output gap, and the other is that its implements the trade weight rule such that the weight is always equal to its trade share 15 .
Dollar-peg regime
Lastly, we regard the dollar-peg regime as an extreme case of the basket-peg regime such that the basket weight of the baht-dollar rate is always equal to 1. Therefore, the home central bank intervenes into the foreign exchange market to maintain the following special basket equation expressed in log- 
Equilibrium
In this section, we de…ne the equilibrium of this economy. First of all, we derive equilibrium equations from optimality conditions which we obtained in the previous section. Based on the ‡exible-price equilibrium values speci…ed in Appendix B, we calculate the deviation of variables from their ‡exible-price equilibrium values. For the special case, equilibrium conditions under the basket-peg regime are discussed in Section 4.3.
Equilibrium Conditions
The uncovered interest parity (UIP) conditions can be shown as follows based on equation (12') 16
Equilibrium condition for domestic bonds can be written as
where B t is the total supply of domestic bonds.
Equilibrium requires that production equals consumption 17 . For domestically produced output, it requires that
Since we assume capital mobility across two foreign countries, the same amount of risk premium appears in both equations. 1 7 We do not explicitly de…ne the equilibrium condition for labor and imported materials which can be de…ned as
In the log-linearized version,
Using (1'), (2'), (3') (9'), (11'), (20') and (21), we obtain the IS curve for the economy, such as
where details of the coe¢ cients are shown in Appendix.
For money demand equations, we have
Deviations from the ‡exible-price equilibrium
When prices are sticky, output and real exchange rates can di¤er from their ‡exible-price equilibrium values speci…ed in Appendix B. We de…ne output gap x t y t y o t . We expressâ t as its percentage deviation from the ‡exible-price equilibrium value.
Real marginal cost, given by equation (15) can be shown as follows using equation (3') (11'), (A1)
Substituting this expression into equation (18'), we obtain the AS curve such as;
where we assume e B=Y For IS curve, from (25') and using uncovered interest parity condition (UIP),
Moreover, for LM curve, we obtain 18 ,
Compared to IS and AS curves in the closed economy, there are two key di¤erences: one is both AS and IS depend on E tê B=i t+1 ,ê
B=i t for i = J; U S since Home CPI depends on exchange rates. The latter is that they also depend on E tqt+1 , andq t as the price decisions of both domestic …rms and exporting …rms rely on the price of imported intermediate goods. Therefore, these two conditions depend on deviation of exchange rates and the price of imported intermediate goods from the ‡exible-price equilibrium values.
Equilibrium condition under the basket-peg regime
Under the basket-peg regime, using the basket equation (24) , IS, AS, and LM can be expressed as In this section, we de…ne the rules for policy instruments. Throughout this section, we assume that home central bank attempts to minimize the following quadratic function, which is de…ned in terms of in ‡ation and output gap.
Furthermore, we assume that home central bank commits to an instrument rule such that it allows to choose credibly, one for all an optimal state-contingent plan.
Interest rate rule under the ‡oating regime
We start from the interest rate rule under the ‡oating rate regime. We de…ne the interest rate rule, one type of the "Taylor rule" introduced by Taylor (1993) , which relates periodic adjustments in a money market interest rate made in response to existing in ‡ation and output gap measures:
In addition, we also consider the "augmented interest rate rule" which a money market interest rate adjusts in response to the baht-dollar exchange rate together with in ‡ation output gap:
System with interest rate rule is shown as min L t subject to equation (27) , (28) and (31) or (31'). Note we do not need LM curve here as the central bank chooses the optimal level of real interest rate which directly a¤ects the IS curve.
Money supply rule under the ‡oating regime
Next, we consider the money supply rule. In this case, nominal money supply is used as an instrument for specifying policy actions that are designed to keep in ‡ation and output gap at the target level:
System with money supply rule are min L t subject to equation (27) , (28), (29) and (32) . Change in nominal money supply will have impacts on the economy through LM curve shown as equation (29).
Basket weight rule under the basket-peg regime
Now, we analyze instrument rules under the basket-peg regime. We de…ne the exogenous shock We specify the basket weight rule which relates periodic adjustments in a multiple of basket weight and exogenous shock in response to existing in ‡ation and output gap measures:
Then we can express the systems with basket-weight rule as follows; min L t subject to equation (27a), (28a), (29a), and (33).
Trade weight rule under the basket-peg regime
Next, we consider the rule such that the home central bank commits the basket weight to its trade weight:
where T R U S is the US trade weight shown as
. By implementing the trade weight rule, the central bank can also a¤ect the exchange rates as in the basket weight rule case.
We can express system using the trade-weight rule as follows: min L t subject to equation (27a), (28a), (29a), and (34).
Fixed rate rule under the dollar-peg regime
Lastly, under the dollar-peg regime, we analyze the following rule such that the weight for the bahtdollar exchange rate is always equal to one shown as:
We can express system with the …xed rate as follows:
min L t subject to equation (27a), (28a), (29a), and (35).
Numerical analysis: case of Singapore and Thailand
In this section, we present quantitative analysis based on calibration results with Singaporean and Thai data. We use both quarterly data from the IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS) and annual data from the IMF Direction of Trade statistics (DOT) 19 . Thailand had adopted the …xed exchange rate against the US dollar, but it has shifted to the ‡oating regime since 1997Q3. In order to take this into account, we de…ne our sample period from 1997Q3 to 2006Q2. The majority of the variables, exempting the interest rates and exchange rate risks, are denominated in natural log.
The procedure of simulations is comprised of 4 steps. First, we set some parameters in the model based on the data set and calculate the deviations from their ‡exible-price equilibrium values. Next, we apply unit root tests and co-integration tests. In the third step, we estimate policy instrument equations and specify exogenous shock processes. Finally, we calibrate the model with the designated parameters to examine impulse responses of the output gap and in ‡ation rate with respect to exogenous shocks. By using actual data for exogenous shocks, we calculate proxy cumulative losses under …ve policy instruments, which correspond to losses under the period 1997Q3 to 2006Q2.
Selected parameters and variables
Before applying unit root tests of variables, we need to specify some parameters in the model. As in standard international real business cycle model (IRBC) as Arellano (2008) We calculate the preference parameters using the annual export and import shares of both Singapore and Thailand in 2002 from the IMF DOT, together with the annual consumption and GDP data from the IMF IFS.
[Insert Table 1 
Unit root and co-integration tests
This subsection provides results of unit root and co-integration tests. First, we apply the Dicky-Fuller
General Least Square (DF-GLS) unit root test. Results of these unit root tests are summarized in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 here]
For Thailand, we apply the Johansen co-integration tests before estimating policy instruments, since our unit root results indicate that both output gap and in ‡ation have an unit root. However, as shown in Table 3 , we do not …nd any co-integration relationships for four equations.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Estimation of policy instruments and shock processes
Re ‡ecting the results of our unit root and co-integration tests presented above, we regress the policy instrument rules and optimality conditions using Singaporean and Thai quarterly data. For Thai output gap and in ‡ation which have a unit root, we use the …rst di¤erence of these variables in order to satisfy the stationarity. Next, for the basket weight, we de…ne the optimal basket weight as = 0:68 ( = 1:47) which is derived in Yoshino, Kaji and Asonuma (2009) 20 . Results of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation are shown in Table 4 .
[Insert Table 4 here]
For exogenous shocks, we …t AR(1) processes to (log) real baht-dollar exchange rate, real baht-yen exchange rate, a risk premium and oil price respectively using quarterly data for the speci…ed sample. Table 5 summarizes the parameter values we set.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Impulse responses
In this paper, we focus primarily on two issues. One of them is di¤erence in impacts of exogenous shocks on the output gap and in ‡ation rate under the policy instrument rules. The other is comparison of cumulative losses under the speci…ed instrument rules.
To facilitate the …rst interest, we calibrate the model using parameters de…ned above. 
Cumulative losses
In this subsection, we discuss the relative superiority of policy instrument rules in terms of cumulative losses. We calculate two sets of cumulative losses for two countries; (1) using the actual exogenous shock data for the period from 1997Q3 to 2006Q2 and (2) using the random exogenous shock data for the long span (60 quarters).
Cumulative losses with actual data (…xed time periods)
We start from the cumulative losses using the actual exogenous shock data for the period from 1997Q3 to 2006Q2. We use a discount factor = 0:99 and relative importance of policy objectives of two countries ($ = 0:075 for Singapore and $ = 0:10 for Thailand).
[Insert Table 6 here]
Some implications are obtained from Table 6 ; First, the cumulative loss under the basket weight rule is the smallest among …ve policy instrument rules in both countries. It re ‡ects that the central bank can e¤ectively minimize the impacts on the output gap and in ‡ation through the exchange rate channels by committing to its basket weight to the target variables.
Second, the cumulative loss under the augmented interest rate rule is smaller than one under the interest rate rule. It shows the clear advantage of committing to the rule which includes the dollar exchange rate as one of the targets since both the output gap and in ‡ation are largely a¤ected by ‡uctuations of the dollar exchange rate.
Third, the higher values of cumulative losses under the trade weight rule and the …xed rate rule compared to one under the …xed rate rule are due to the disadvantage of the rules such that the central bank can not adjust the basket weight smoothly to its target variables.
Cumulative losses with the long span
Next, we analyze which optimal instrument rule is desirable for the long span (60 quarters). In order to consider the cumulative losses during the tranquil period, we calculate the loss for each policy instrument using the random exogenous shocks derived from normal distributions with variances of shocks under post-Asian Currency Crisis period (from 1999Q3 to 2006Q2). The variances of the shocks are shown in Table 7 .
[Insert Table 7 here]
We set the time span as 60 quarters (15 years [Insert Figure 6 here]
We obtain some implications from Figure 6 ; …rst, in the case of Singapore, the cumulative loss under the interest rate rule is smaller than one under the basket weight rule as the time span is longer than 53 quarters. It re ‡ects the advantage of the interest rate rule under the long and tranquil period which the variance of the real baht-dollar rate shock is small ( p eB=$ = 0:023). Second, in the case of Thailand, the cumulative loss under the basket weight rule remains the smallest as the time span gets longer. As the variances of both the baht-dollar and baht-yen exchange rates are moderate (around 0.05), the central bank still be able to gain the advantage of e¢ ciency of commitment to the rule through the exchange rate channels.
Comparison of interest rate and basket weight rules
Lastly, we consider the comparison of interest rate rule and basket weight rules.
[Insert Table 8 here] Table 8 indicates that in the case of Singapore, it is desirable for the central bank to implement the interest rate rule which commits to the output gap and in ‡ation, rather than the augmented interest rate rule which have three target variables such as exchange rate together with the output gap and in ‡ation. As mentioned above, this is highly associated with low variance of real baht-dollar exchange rate in the sample period.
On the other hand, in the case of Thailand, adopting the augmented interest rate rules leads to lower cumulative losses compared one of the interest rate rule. These results possibly depend on the fact that the variances of the real baht-dollar and baht-yen exchange rates are moderate (around 0.05). However, the cumulative losses under the augmented interest rate rule are still higher than one of the basket weight rule.
As a brief summary, with high or moderate variances of exchange rates, it is desirable to implement the basket weight rule taking into account the e¢ ciency of exchange rate channels to the targets. At the same time, the augmented interest rate rules which includes the exchange rates as the target variables might be possible options. On contrary, with low variances of exchange rates, the central bank can obtain the low cumulative loss by committing to the interest rate rule.
Conclusion
This paper attempts to solve two puzzles concerning the basket-peg regime. For the …rst puzzle, there still remains the question as to whether or not adopting the basket-peg regime rather than the ‡oating regime is optimal for East Asian countries. Furthermore, under the basket-peg regime, there is a trade-o¤ between optimality based on the consideration of the capital movements across countries and practical usefulness. On the basis of a small open-economy model with micro foundations under imperfect capital mobility, we derive a simple basket weight rule, which is sub-optimal but practically easy to implement. With an exercise of comparison among the calibrated cumulative losses using Singaporean and Thai quarterly data from 1997Q3 to 2006Q2, we show that adopting the basket weight rule is superior to the implementation of the interest rate or money supply rule under the ‡oating regime or trade weight rule under the basket peg regime for an open-economy like Thailand.
There are two reasons for relative superiority of the basket weight rule: one is that the monetary authority can focus only on e¤ects of the yen exchange rate, since the dollar rate is endogenous, but determined solely by the yen exchange rate as long as it maintains the weighted averages of exchange rates at the constant value by foreign market interventions. The other is that by committing to the basket weight rule, the monetary authority is able to stabilize the impacts on the output gap and in ‡ation rate through exchange rate channels which are missing under the interest rate rule or money supply rule. Although our focus is speci…c to East Asian countries, our analysis can be applied to any open economy which has close economic relationships with several countries.
A The equilibrium conditions
The IS curve is shown as,
From the market clearing condition for goods produced in Home, we obtain the expression for c t ,
The AS curve of the economy can be rewritten as,
,
B Flexible price equilibrium
We assume that the foreign real interest rate r 
